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Parties to the Appeal 
The parties to the appeal are Appellant Walter Michael Andrus, as Trustee of the 
Mary Elizabeth Andrus Nevada Trust, and Appellee Rebekah Andrus. 
Table of Contents 
Table of Authorities 2 
Jurisdictional Statement 2 
Statement of Issues & Standard of Review 3 
Constitutional or Statutory Provisions 4 
Statement of the Case 4 
Statement of Facts 4 
Summary of Argument 10 
Argument 11 
Conclusion 22 
Addendum 24 
Table of Authorities 
In re Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969 (Utah 1996) 
In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981) 
Andrus v. Blazzard, 63 P. 888 (Utah 1901) 
Jurisdictional Statement 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
section 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
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Statement of Issues and Standard of Review 
The issues on appeal include: 
a) Whether the District Court erred in granting partial summary judgment for the 
Appellee and denying summary judgment in favor of the Appellant where the Appellant 
(acting as the court-appointed guardian of an incapacitated person, during the term of 
incapacity, and prior to the death of the incapacitated person) executed a change of 
beneficiary form on the incapacitated person's term life insurance policy reducing the 
Appellee's share of the benefits of the life insurance policy and instead directing a share 
of the proceeds to a trust for the incapacitated person's minor daughter, and 
b) Whether the District Court erred in granting partial summary judgment for the 
Appellee by relying on disputed issues of material fact, where counsel for the Appellee 
referenced disputed material facts in his memoranda and his oral argument at the motion 
hearing, including references to the transcript of a deposition of Appellant which 
Appellant was not allowed to review, correct, or sign. 
These issues were preserved for appeal in the Appellant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Interpleader Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, and Appellant's oral argument at the hearing on the parties' 
Motions for Summary Judgment (Original Transcript for Hearing dated 9/1/09). 
The applicable standard of appellate review is correctness: whether the trial court 
correctly interpreted and applied the law to the undisputed facts. 
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Constitutional or Statutory Provisions 
Utah Code section 75-5-312(2) 
Utah Code section 31A-22-413(2) 
Statement of the Case 
This appeal is from an Order of the Fifth District Court in and for Washington 
County, case no. 0805001087, entered on September 30, 2009, which granted partial 
summary judgment for the Appellee and denied the Appellant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Fifth District Court certified the Order as a final judgment pursuant to 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on December 9, 2009. 
On appeal, the Appellant seeks reversal of the Order granting partial summary 
judgment for the Appellee. The Appellant seeks entry of summary judgment in favor of 
the Appellant or remand to the trial court for further proceedings or a trial of the disputed 
material facts. 
Statement of Facts 
In the trial court, Plaintiff/Appellant Mike Andrus asserted that the following 
facts, supported by the Exhibits attached to Plaintiff/Appellant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Interpleader Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (which is 
hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiffs Memorandum"), were materially relevant and 
undisputed: 
1. On about August 17, 2001, Mike Andrus5 son, Jared Andrus, purchased a term life 
insurance policy, No. 15843524 (hereinafter "the life insurance policy" or "the 
policy"), with a death benefit of $500,000 and no cash value, from Northwestern 
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Mutual Life Insurance Company. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 1, 
Affidavit of Walter Michael Andrus, 12; Exhibit 2, Life Insurance Policy. 
2. At the time of the purchase, Jared Andrus designated his wife, Rebekah Andrus, as 
the sole beneficiary of the life insurance policy's death benefit. See Plaintiffs 
Memorandum, Exhibit 2. 
3. In 2007, Jared Andrus became seriously ill with cancer. See Plaintiffs 
Memorandum, Exhibit 1,1f 4. 
4. Due to his illness and his concerns over the immaturity and instability of his wife, 
Rebekah Andrus, Jared Andrus asked his father, Mike Andrus, if he would be 
willing to serve as Jared5 s guardian if Jared became incapacitated. See Plaintiffs 
Memorandum, Exhibit 1, *[J 5. 
5. Prior to the guardianship appointment, Jared Andrus informed Mike Andrus of the 
existence of the life insurance policy and expressed his desire that, should Jared 
die from the cancer, the insurance proceeds should be used to provide a secure 
future, including a college education and financial independence, for his young 
daughter, Mary Elizabeth Andrus, and that the funds not be wasted on mundane 
living expenses. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 1,^6. 
6. Prior to the guardianship appointment, Jared Andrus also told Mike Andrus that, 
due to Rebekah Andrus5 mental and emotional instability, he could not rely on her 
to responsibly provide for their daughter's financial security. See Plaintiffs 
Memorandum, Exhibit 1,^7. 
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7. On June 15, 2007, Jared Andrus filed a Petition for Guardianship of an 
Incapacitated Person with the Utah Fifth District Court, asking the Court to 
appoint his father, Mike Andrus, as his legal guardian, on the grounds that Jared 
Andrus was suffering from cancer and that "his illness . . . caused [him] to lack 
sufficient understanding and capacity to make and communicate responsible 
decisions." See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 3, Petition for Guardianship. 
8. On June 18, 2007, Mike Andrus took Jared Andrus, who was living with him at 
the time, to a session of chemotherapy treatment for this cancer. When they 
arrived, the nurse informed them that only one person could stay with Jared during 
the session, so Mike Andrus, at Jared's request, called Jared's wife, Rebekah 
Andrus, who was supposed to meet them there. Mike Andrus gave her Jared's 
messages, telling her that Jared wanted Mike to stay with him and that Rebekah 
did not need to come to the session. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 1,^9. 
9. On that date, after Jared completed a difficult eight hours of treatment, Mike 
Andrus drove him home. On the way home, Jared called Rebekah to let her know 
how things were going. During the conversation, which Mike Andrus could hear 
because Jared had the cell phone on speaker phone mode, Rebekah became upset 
with Jared and told him that she was putting him out of her life for her own well-
being. She also told him that she did not like being treated like a criminal in that 
she did not want her visits with him (at Mike Andrus' house) to be monitored (as 
Jared had requested that he not be left alone with her). When Mike Andrus heard 
her make this cruel and selfish statements, Mike took the phone, told her, "This is 
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why" (meaning Tared did not want to be alone with her because of the way she 
was treating him), and hung up the phone. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 
1, U 10; Exhibit 4, pgs. 2-3. 
10. On that date, shortly after Mike Andrus and Tared Andrus arrived at Mike's home, 
Rebekah Andrus' brother-in-law arrived at the home, stood in the driveway, and 
repeatedly attempted to call Mike Andrus and verbally harass him. After the man 
left, Mike Andrus called the police, who came to take a report on the incident. 
Mike Andrus watched Tared fill out a witness statement for the police in which 
Tared expressed his concerns about Rebekah Andrus and related the incidents of 
that day. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 1, ^ f 11; Exhibit 4. 
11. Tared Andrus' witness statement to the police states: "Rebekah and I have had a 
difficult marriage. Her behavior matches a condition called paranoid personality 
disorder. My father and I [agreed], and Rebekah agreed also, that to prevent and 
stop her behavior that has caused me extreme stress and anxiety and interfered 
with my healing in many ways including causing insomnia and adrenalin highs[,] 
her visits and conversations with me would be monitored." See Plaintiffs 
Memorandum, Exhibit 4, pg. 2. 
12. Tared Andrus' witness statement also states: "Rebekah said in response [to his 
request that her visits to him be short and earlier in the day] that she has put me 
out of her life so that she can function. Then she expressed unhappiness at our 
visits being monitored and being treated like a common criminal when she is here 
at my father's home." See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 4., pg. 3. 
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13. Jared Andrus5 witness statement further reads: "I want to be here at my father's 
home with him and Ruth caring for me. I want to continue to do so. I have 
expressed this to Rebekah. I do not want to go home or anywhere else." See 
Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 4, pg. 4. 
14. On July 10, 2007, in Jared's guardianship case, Judge Shumate, of the Utah Fifth 
District Court, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, which 
ordered that Mike Andrus was appointed as the legal guardian of Jared Andrus. 
See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 5, Findings of Fact. 
15. The Order contains a finding that the "Petitioner's spouse, Rebekah Andrus, is 
disqualified from serving as guardian on the grounds that the Petitioner has 
previously nominated Michael Andrus to serve as his guardian and that Rebekah 
Andrus is mentally, physically, emotionally, and financially incapable of serving 
as the guardian of the Petitioner." See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 5, \ 15. 
16. On July 10, 2007, the Fifth District Court also issued a Letter of Guardianship, 
verifying that Mike Andrus was appointed as his son's guardian and that Mike 
Andrus5 authority included "all the powers, authorities, rights, and responsibilities 
of full legal guardianship of Jared Michael Andrus." See Plaintiffs 
Memorandum, Exhibit 6, Letter of Guardianship. 
17. On July 17, 2007, Mike Andrus, as "full legal guardian of Jared Michael Andrus," 
executed a Northwestern Mutual form entitled "Designation of Beneficiaries by 
Owner For Death Proceeds Only" (hereinafter "the beneficiary change form"), 
which designated Jared's wife, Rebekah Andrus, as the beneficiary of 15% of the 
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life insurance policy proceeds and the Mary Elizabeth Andrus Nevada Trust as the 
beneficiary of 85% of the life insurance proceeds. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, 
Exhibit 7, Designation of Beneficiaries Form. 
18. On July 19, 2007, Mike Andrus, acting as Jared Andrus' guardian, executed a trust 
agreement, entitled "Mary Elizabeth Andrus Nevada Trust," for the purpose of 
holding "[a]ny and all payments due the trust . . . from any life insurance owned 
by Jared Michael Andrus" for the benefit of Mary Elizabeth Andrus, the minor 
daughter of Jared and Rebekah Andrus. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 8, 
Mary Elizabeth Andrus Nevada Trust Agreement; Plaintiffs Memorandum, 
Exhibit 1,113. 
19. On December 23, 2007, Jared Andrus passed away. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, 
Exhibit 1,117. 
20. In early January 2008, Mike Andrus submitted the beneficiary change form to 
Northwestern Mutual. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 1,118. 
21. Upon Northwestern Mutual's refusal to pay the death benefit, Mike Andrus 
brought this legal action, as Trustee of the Mary Elizabeth Andrus Nevada Trust, 
in order to secure 85% of the policy proceeds in the Trust for the benefit of his 
young granddaughter, Mary Elizabeth Andrus, so that the proceeds would not be 
wasted by Rebekah Andrus and so that Mary will be ensured a college education 
and a secure financial future. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 1,119. 
22. At all times, while acting as Jared Andrus' guardian—in changing the life 
insurance beneficiary designation and setting up the trust for Mary Elizabeth 
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Andrus—Mike Andrus believed he was acting in complete accordance with 
Jared's expressed desires, for the benefit of Mary Elizabeth Andrus, and in the 
best interests of Jared Andrus. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 1,1f 20. 
23. Mike Andrus did not receive, and never expected to receive, any compensation for 
his appointment and work as guardian of Jared Andrus. See Plaintiffs 
Memorandum, Exhibit 1, f 21. 
24. Mike Andrus, for his services in acting as Trustee of the Mary Elizabeth Andrus 
Nevada Trust, does not intend to receive any compensation from the proceeds of 
the policy at issue in this case and intends that all proceeds payable to the Trust 
will go to Mary's benefit. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 1,1f 22. 
25.In September 2008, Northwestern Mutual stipulated that it was unable to 
determine who was entitled to the life insurance policy proceeds and that it had no 
interest in the proceeds. 
26. Pursuant to the stipulation, Northwestern Mutual deposited the $500,000 death 
benefit, plus interest, with this Court and was dismissed from this action with 
prejudice. 
27.Rebekah Andrus' undisputed 15% of the proceeds has been paid to her, with 
interest. 
Summary of Argument 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Appellee Rebekah Andrus 
because, on the undisputed material facts, as a matter of law, Appellant Mike Andrus, as 
Jared's court-appointed guardian, was acting within his authority as guardian when he 
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executed a change of beneficiary form on July 17, 2007, making the Mary Elizabeth 
Andrus Nevada Trust, created for the benefit of Jared5s daughter, the beneficiary of 85% 
of the policy proceeds. The trial court should have ruled that, as a matter of law, the 
beneficiary change was enforceable and granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Plaintiff/Appellant. 
The trial court may also have erred by granting summary judgment for Appellee 
based on disputed material facts. In his memoranda related to summary judgment and in 
oral argument at the hearing on the motions for summary judge, counsel for Appellee 
made multiple references to a deposition of Appellant Mike Andrus. Counsel for the 
Appellant objecled, both in his memorandum and at oral argument, to the references to 
the deposition on the grounds that Appellant Andrus was promised that he would be 
allowed to review and correct the deposition before signing it but then was not allowed to 
do so and never signed it. As the trial court did not make specific findings of the 
undisputed material facts upon which it relied in granting partial summary judgment for 
the Appellee, the judgment should be reversed and remanded for the entry of such facts 
or for trial on the disputed facts. 
Argument 
The trial court should have granted summary judgment for the Plaintiff/Appellant 
on the grounds that, on the undisputed facts detailed above, Mike Andrus had authority, 
as Jared Andrus5 court-appointed guardian, to change the beneficiary designation of 
Jared5s policy. Because Mike Andrus, acting as Jared5s lawful guardian, properly 
executed the beneficiary change form and submitted it in a timely manner, Rebecca 
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Andrus is only entitled to 15% of the proceeds, which have already been paid to her, and 
the remainder should be paid to the Mary Elizabeth Andrus Nevada Trust for the benefit 
of Jared and Rebecca's minor child, Mary Elizabeth Andrus. 
I. Under the Utah Code, the authority that may be granted to a court-appointed 
guardian of an incapacitated person is broad enough to allow the guardian to 
change a life insurance beneficiary designation. 
A. Utah Code section 75-5-312(2) allows broad powers to court-appointed 
guardians. 
Appellant/Plaintiff Mike Andrus (hereinafter generally referred to as "Appellant") 
asserts that, under Utah law, unless specifically limited by the appointing court, a court-
appointed guardian of an incapacitated person has authority to change a life insurance 
beneficiary designation. Utah's statutory scheme is broad and allows the appointing 
court to entrust the guardian with full authority to act on behalf of the incapacitated ward. 
Utah Code section 75-5-312(2) defines the powers of a guardian as follows: 
Absent a specific limitation on the guardian's power in the order of 
appointment, the guardian has the same powers, rights, and duties respecting 
the ward that a parent has respecting the parent's unemancipated minor child 
except that a guardian is not liable to third persons for acts of the ward solely 
by reason of the parental relationship. 
When one considers the authority and rights that a parent has with regard to his or her 
minor child, it is clear that the Utah Legislature has expressly made the authority of a 
court-appointed guardian, unless limited by the appointing court, very broad. 
The Utah Supreme Court has affirmed the broad scope of powers which may be 
granted to a court appointed guardian. In the case of In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 
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1981), emphasizing that the trial court has authority to limit the scope of guardianship at 
the time of appointment, the court wrote: 
Although the powers conferred upon a guardian may be very broad, the court 
is authorized to tailor the powers of a guardian to the specific needs of the 
ward. In appointing a guardian, the court should state with particularity the 
powers granted, unless the full scope of the statutory authorization is 
warranted. 
Id. at 1091 (emphasis added). 
Assuming that the appointing court has not limited the guardian's powers, Utah 
Code section 75-5-312(2) sets up this practical test for determining whether or not a 
guardian's act falls within the scope of his authority as guardian: Does a parent have 
authority to take such an action on behalf of the parent's minor child? Or, as specifically 
applied to the present case: Does a parent have authority to change the beneficiary of a 
minor child's life insurance policy? The answer to this test is straightforward in the 
present case: The parent must use the correct form and submit the form in a timely 
manner, but nothing in Utah law limits a parent's authority to change his or her child's 
life insurance beneficiary. Thus, under section 75-5-312(2) the authority that an 
appointing court may authorize to a guardian includes the authority to change a life 
insurance policy beneficiary. 
It is also important to note that Utah Code section 75-5-312(2) does not place any 
further limitations on a guardian's authority. The second sentence of section 75-5-312(2) 
does impose certain duties on the guardian, such as caring for the ward and his property, 
but it specifically states that the rights and duties are listed "without qualifying" the broad 
grant of authority stated in the first sentence of the section. 
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Finally, it is good public policy to allow a guardian, if not prohibited by the 
appointing court for good cause, to execute beneficiary changes on the incapacitated 
person's insurance policy. This allows the guardian to take present conditions into 
account and effectuate the known wishes of the incapacitated person, for the best interest 
of the incapacitated person. That is exactly what happened in the present case, where the 
guardian changed the beneficiary in order to preserve the insurance proceeds for the 
benefit of Jared Andrus' young daughter and to prevent the proceeds from being wasted 
by Appellee Rebekah Andrus, who was deemed unfit to be Jared's guardian by the 
appointing court. 
B. Andrus v. Blazzard can be distinguished from the present case. 
Interpleader Plaintiff/Appellee Rebekah Andrus (hereinafter generally referred to 
as "Appellee") argued in the lower courts that Andrus v. Blazzard, 63 P. 888 (Utah 1901), 
supports her argument that a guardian lacks authority to change a beneficiary designation. 
However, the facts and legal issues in Andrus are much different from the present case 
and thus Andrus is neither controlling nor persuasive. 
Andrus v. Blazzard can be distinguished from the present case in several ways. 
First, in Andrus, the guardian attempted to enter into a contract on behalf of the ward. In 
the present case, the ward, Jared Andrus, had entered into a contract, an insurance policy, 
prior to the guardianship. Mike Andrus, as guardian of Jared Andrus, did not attempt to 
contract on Jared's behalf. Instead, acting as guardian and in Jared's best interest, Mike 
Andrus exercised a personal option that was allowed by the policy to change the policy's 
beneficiary. 
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Second, the issue in Andrus was whether the guardian or the ward was liable on 
the contract. This issue does not exist in the present case, as Jared Andrus fulfilled his 
obligations on the contract by paying his insurance premiums and Mike Andrus was not 
seeking to impose a contractual financial burden on his ward. 
Given these significant factual and legal differences between Andrus and the 
present case, this court should conclude that Andrus gives no practical guidance in 
applying Utah Code section 75-5-312(2). 
C. This is an issue of first impression in Utah, 
Counsel for Mike Andrus has researched Utah's appellate case law and can find 
no relevant cases to assist the Court on this issue. Since the issue of whether a guardian 
can change the beneficiary of a ward's insurance policy is one of first impression in Utah, 
it is fortunate that the plain language of section 75-5-312(2) is clear enough for the Court 
to conclude that, just as a parent is not legally prohibited from changing the beneficiary 
of a minor child's insurance policy, a guardian with full guardianship authority is also not 
prohibited from making such a change. 
D, The insurance proceeds are not part of Jared Andrus5 estate and thus 
conservatorship law does not apply. 
Appellee previously asserted in the lower courts that the insurance policy should 
have been included in Jared Andrus' estate. Appellee thus attempts to impose the 
requirements of a conservator on Mike Andrus, on the theory that the $500,000 death 
benefit would have necessitated the appointment of a conservator, in addition to a 
guardian. 
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Appellee's theory is incorrect, because Jared Andrus' insurance policy was a 
contractual obligation between Jared Andrus and Northwestern Mutual, with the proceeds 
to be paid to the beneficiaries outside of the insured's estate. The policy was a term life 
insurance policy with no cash value and a $500,000 death benefit. There was no need for 
a conservator in the present case because Jared Andrus' estate, which included only 
personal property and limited home equity, was valued at $9,000. The $500,000 death 
benefit could not have been managed by a conservator because it had no cash value and 
was payable to the beneficiaries outside the insured's estate. 
Appellee's argument would be correct if the facts of this case involved an 
insurance policy with a cash value of $500,000 to which the insured was entitled. In such 
a case, the cash value would have been subject to the management of a conservator, who 
could have sought early disbursement or loans on the cash value. Upon the insured's 
death, any remaining cash value would have passed into the insured's estate. But such 
was not the case here. 
In sum, based on a straightforward application of Utah Code section 75-5-312(2), 
the Court should conclude that Utah's statutory scheme does allow an appointing court to 
grant broad authority, including the authority to change a beneficiary designation, to the 
guardian of an incapacitated person. 
II. The Letter of Guardianship issued to Mike Andrus by the Fifth District 
Court is broad and does not limit his authority to change the beneficiary 
designation. 
16 
Given that section 75-5-312 does empower Utah's district courts to place limits on 
the powers of a court-appointed guardian, the next inquiry is whether the appointing court 
placed limits on the guardian's authority in the present case. On the undisputed facts, it is 
clear that the court did not. 
In conjunction with the Order appointing Mike Andrus as Jared Andrus' guardian, 
which Order itself contains no limits on Mike Andrus' authority as guardian, the Fifth 
District Court also issued a Letter of Guardianship which states that Mike Andrus' 
authority included "all the powers, authorities, rights, and responsibilities of full legal 
guardianship of Jared Michael Andrus." 
Specifically, the Fifth District Court found that Jared Andrus was incapacitated 
(i.e., lacking "sufficient understanding and capacity to make and communicate 
responsible decisions"). The court also found that Rebekah Andrus was unfit to serve as 
Jared's guardian. On these findings, it should be clear that the court intended to grant 
broad authority to Mike Andrus, as Jared's guardian, to make decisions for Jared and act 
in his best interest. 
III. Mike Andrus was acting in Jared Andrus5 best interest in changing 
the policy beneficiary. 
Given the appointing court's finding regarding Rebekah Andrus in the Findings 
that supported Mike Andrus' appointment as Jared's guardian (namely, that she was unfit 
to serve), it is also apparent that Mike Andrus' decision to change the beneficiary was in 
Jared's best interest. Prior to the guardianship appointment, Jared Andrus told his father 
of the existence of the life insurance policy and expressed his desire that, should Jared die 
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from the cancer, the policy proceeds should be used to ensure a secure future, including a 
college education and financial independence, for Jared's young daughter, Mary 
Elizabeth Andrus. Jared also expressed his concern that the insurance funds not be 
wasted on mundane living expenses. If Rebekah Andrus was unfit to serve as Jared5s 
guardian due to mental and emotional instability, it stands to reason that it was in Jared's 
best interest that Rebekah Andrus should be removed as the sole beneficiary of Jared's 
policy and that a trust should be set up to protect a share of the proceeds for the benefit of 
Jared's young child. 
IV. The policy does not prohibit a court-appointed guardian from making a 
beneficiary change for an incapacitated policy owner. 
In the U.S. District Court, Appellee argued in her Memorandum that the insurance 
policy did not allow Mike Andrus to change the beneficiary. However, the policy itself 
does not expressly prohibit a guardian from making a beneficiary change if the policy 
owner has become incapacitated and is under the care of a court-appointed guardian. 
Where the policy addresses the manner in which the policy owner can make a beneficiary 
change, but is silent on whether or not a court-appointed guardian can make such a 
change on behalf of the policy owner, the court must look back to state law for guidance. 
The insurer and its policy are subject to state law and cannot supercede the 
provisions of Utah's statutes. In the present case, the policy states that "the Owner" may 
change the beneficiaries of death proceeds while the insured is alive. While Jared Andrus 
did not personally make the beneficiary change, the change was made while Jared Andrus 
was alive by Jared Andrus' court-appointed guardian, acting on behalf of Jared and in his 
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best interest. Since the policy owner, Jared Andrus, was legally incapacitated at the time, 
Mike Andrus, by court appointment, stood in Jared5 s place as the policy owner. 
V. Mike Andrus submitted the beneficiary change form in a timely manner 
under Utah law. 
Appellee also argued in the U.S. District Court that Mike Andrus5 submission of 
the beneficiary change form was untimely. The insurance policy language stating that a 
"change of beneficiary will be made on receipt at the Home office of written request that 
is acceptable to the Company55 and that the change will then "take effect as of the date it 
was signed55 is vague. The most reasonable interpretation of this provision is that the 
insurer will make the change once an acceptable written request is received at the home 
office and that the change will be effective as of the date it was signed. 
Moreover, nothing in the policy specifically requires the beneficiary change to be 
submitted to the insurer prior to the insured's death. If the policy did contain such a 
requirement, it would be voided by the clear terms of Utah Code section 31A-22-413(2), 
which states: 
An insurer may prescribe formalities to be complied with for the change of 
beneficiaries, but those formalities may only be designed for the protection 
of the insurer. The insurer discharges its obligation under the insurance 
policy or certificate of insurance if it pays the properly designated 
beneficiary unless it has actual notice of either an assignment or a change in 
beneficiary designation made pursuant to Subsection (l)(b) or Section 75-2-
804. The insurer has actual notice if the formalities prescribed by the policy 
are complied with, or if the change in beneficiary has been requested in the 
form prescribed by the insurer and delivered to an agent representing the 
insurer at least three days prior to payment to the earlier properly designated 
beneficiary. 
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Pursuant to section 31A-22-413(2), an insurer has no obligation to pay the prior 
beneficiary where a change has been requested using the proper form and delivered to an 
agent at least three days prior to payment of the prior beneficiary. Applying this section 
to the present case, Northwestern Mutual had no obligation under the policy to pay 
Rebekah Andrus 100% of the proceeds because Mike Andrus made the beneficiary 
change using the proper form and delivered the request to Northwestern more than three 
days before any payment was made to Mrs. Andrus. 
In re Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969 (Utah 1996), is controlling on the issue of 
whether an insurer must accept a beneficiary change request that was delivered after the 
insured's death in compliance with section 31A-22-413. In Knickerbocker, the policy 
owner's attorney-in-fact, acting pursuant to a power of attorney and without knowing 
who the insurer was, executed a beneficiary change and gave it to his attorney, who, after 
the insured's death, located the insurer and delivered the change form to the insurer. The 
Utah Supreme Court ruled that the change was effective upon execution: 
We find no authority prohibiting a change-of-beneficiary notice from being 
effective simply because an attorney-in-fact, or even the principal, did not 
know the specific name of the insurer at the time the notice was executed. 
The only requirement is that the formalities prescribed by the insurance 
company must be complied with, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22--413,.... 
Id. at 978 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court further rejected the argument that 
the change of beneficiary was untimely because it was submitted after the insured's 
death: "We acknowledge that the testimony shows that [the attorney] did not actually 
send the notices until after [the insured's] death. However, once [the attorney-in-fact] 
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signed the notices and entrusted delivery of them to [the attorney], his role was 
completed, and the change of beneficiaries was effected." Id. 
Applying Utah Code section 31A-22-413, as interpreted in Knickerbocker, to the 
present case, the trial court should have concluded that the beneficiary change was 
effective upon execution of the proper form by Mike Andrus, acting as the Owner's 
guardian and in his best interest, and that Mike Andrus' delivery of the change to the 
insurer after the insured's death, but more than three days before the insurer paid any 
proceeds to the prior beneficiary, was not untimely. 
VI. The Court erred in granting partial summary judgment based on disputed 
material facts. 
The trial court may also have erred by granting summary judgment for Appellee 
based on disputed material facts. In his memoranda related to summary judgment and in 
oral argument at the hearing on the motions for summary judge, counsel for Appellee 
made multiple references to a deposition of Appellant Mike Andrus. Use of the 
deposition was disputed on the grounds that Mr. Andrus, prior to the deposition, was 
promised that he would be allowed to review and correct the deposition. However, once 
the deposition was taken, Mr. Andrus was not allowed to make corrections or sign the 
deposition. 
In oral argument at the motion hearing, counsel for Appellee referenced the 
following "facts" from the objectionable deposition, which were disputed by the 
Appellant: 1) that Mr. Andrus' only official action as his son's guardian was the 
execution of the change of beneficiary form (Hearing Transcript, p. 6, lines 18-20), 2) 
21 
that Mr. Andrus wanted control over Rebekah and Mary Andrus (Hearing Transcript, p. 
10, lines 10-15), and that Rebekah Andrus paid the insurance policy premiums while her 
husband was incapacitated (Hearing Transcript, p. 11, lines 20-24). These references 
were material to counsel's argument that Mr. Andrus was acting improperly as Jared 
Andrus' legal guardian. 
Counsel for the Appellant objected, both in his memorandum and at oral 
argument, to the references to the deposition. Hearing Transcript, p. 10, lines 16-19. The 
trial court failed to act on counsel's objection and clarify that its decision was not based 
on any "facts" taken from the disputed deposition. Instead, after counsel's objection, the 
trial court itself referenced the disputed deposition by asserting that Jared Andrus did not 
know about the beneficiary change that Mike Andrus had executed. Hearing Transcript, 
p. 24, lines 1-3. 
The trial court did not make specific findings of the undisputed material facts upon 
which it relied in granting partial summary judgment for the Appellee. Thus, it is 
impossible to know which facts the court relied on in entering judgment. As such, the 
judgment should be reversed and remanded for the entry of the undisputed material facts 
or, if the court did rely on disputed material facts, for trial on the disputed facts. 
Conclusion 
This court should reverse the trial court's decision to grant the Appellee's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and instead should enter judgment for the Appellant, on 
the grounds that, on the undisputed facts and as a matter of law, Mike Andrus had 
statutory and court-appointed authority, as Jared Andrus' guardian, to execute a 
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beneficiary change (which designated Rebekah Andrus as the beneficiary of 15% of the 
proceeds and the Mary Elizabeth Andrus Nevada Trust as the beneficiary of the 
remaining 85%) on behalf of Jared Andrus and did so in a proper and timely manner. 
In the alternative, this court should reverse and remand with direction to the trial 
court to make specific findings of the undisputed material facts upon which it relied in 
entering partial summary judgment or for trial of the disputed facts. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of March, 2010. 
.WuVvuz; 
» Larfy^Vt. Meyer? 
Counsel for Appellant Walter Michael Andrus 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this b day of March, 2010, I served a copy of this 
Brief on counsel for the Appellee by first class US Mail, postage prepaid, to Brady T. 
Gibbs, Wrona Law Firm PC, 11650 S. State St., Suite 103, Draper, UT 84020. 
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Brady T. Gibbs #11049 
LONG OKURA P C. 
1981 Murray Holladay Rd. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Ph: 801.746.6000 
Fax: 1.866.221.4511 
Attorney for Rebekah Andrus 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER MICHAEL ANDRUS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant, 
vs. 
REBEKAH ANDRUS, 
Cross-Claimant. 
ORDER ON HEARING 
Case Number: 080501087 
Judge James L. Shumate 
THIS MATTER, having come on regularly for hearing on the 1st day of 
September, 2009 at 10:00 a.m., before the Honorable James L. Shumate, Fifth District 
Judge presiding on Plaintiff's and Cross-Claimant's cross Motions for Summary 
Judgment. The Petitioner, Walter Michael Andrus, was present and represented by his 
counsel, Larry M. Meyers. The Cross-Claimant, Rebekah Andrus, was present and 
FILED 
MFTH DISTRICT COURT 
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WASHINGTON COUNTY 
„___# 
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represented by her counsel, Brady T. Gibbs. The Court, after having reviewed the file, 
having heard argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing, now order as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That Cross-Claimant, Rebekah Andrus' partial Motion for Summary Judgment 
is hereby granted. 
2. Rebekah Andrus, as the sole direct beneficiary to the proceeds of the 
Northwestern Life Insurance policy No. 15843524, is entitled to one-hundred 
percent of the remaining proceeds of that policy which have been paid to the 
Court by the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company. 
3. The Plaintiff, Walter Andrus', Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
4. Each party is ordered to pay their own attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
this action. 
5. Upon expiration of the deadline to appeal this decision, Cross-Claimant may 
motion this Court to release the proceeds of the life insurance policy. 
DATED THIS 2$ day of >S^fl 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
HON. JAMES L SHUMATE 
Fifth District Court Judge 
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Approved as to FORM: 
Larry M. Meyers 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify, that on this Lj^h day of ^Pf\Qyf\k)e]r 2009, 
I delivered true and correct copy(s) of the foregoing Order on Hearing to the following 
party(s): 
Larry M. Meyers 
Larry Meyers, P.C. 
P.O. Box 1146 
St. George, UT 84771-1146 
\ First Class U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D
 Facsimile Transmission 
° Personal Delivery 
o E-mail Transmission Attachment 
Frank D. Mylar 
Mylar Law, P.C. 
6925 S. Union Park Center, Suite 600 
Cottonwood Heights, UT 84047 
y First Class U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
° Facsimile Transmission 
a Personal Delivery 
° E-mail Transmission Attachment 
